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‘Liberalism’ is famously difficult to define in politics around the world. In the United States, liberals are 
center-left, akin to social democrats in Germany. Similarly, in Sweden, the Liberal People’s Party supports social 
liberalism and has a strong ideological commitment to a mixed economy, with support for comprehensive but 
market-based welfare state programs. In Germany, liberals are nowadays thought to be center-right, and usually 
allies of the conservative party, even though they have worked with the social democrats in the past. In Brazil, the 
term ‘liberal’ is reserved for laissez-faire, right-wing libertarians. The term is so unpopular that political parties 
whose name included the term ‘liberal’ changed their name. When I decided to offer a post-graduate seminar called 
“The History of Liberal Internationalism”, a colleague suggested I change the name to “Liberal Internationalism 
and its Critics” to avoid running the risk of being called a liberal. International discussions about liberalism, in 
short, are bound to lead to confusion. 
In the same way ‘Liberal internationalism’ is perhaps one of the most misunderstood theoretical strands in 
international relations. For some, it is best represented by liberal thinkers such as Harvard’s Michael Ignatieff, 
Princeton’s G. John Ikenberry and the New America Foundation’s Anne-Marie Slaughter, who see themselves as 
‘Wilsonians’. Others -both in the United States and abroad- regard liberal internationalism as a dangerous school 
of thought which has provoked disasters such as the 2003 ‘missionary’ intervention in Iraq. Thinkers in the Global 
South tend to agree with the latter assessment. (The debate about whether Bush was a Wilsonian is best summarized 
in “The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the 21st Century”). At other times, the term is used 
more broadly to describe the application of liberal principles and practices to international politics, and sometimes 
simply the foreign policies of liberal states. 
Beate Jahn’s  Liberal internationalism: Theory, History, Practice  is, in this context, an interesting, if quite 
controversial contribution to the debate. Jahn, a critical theorist and professor at the University of Sussex, rightly 
points out that liberal theories have played a much more fundamental role in and for the discipline of International 
Relations than is often recognized – after all, with very rare exceptions, general accounts of liberalism are mostly 
restricted to textbooks. Furthermore, defining liberalism in contrast to realism is bound to lead to unsatisfactory 
results, given the often complementary relationship between the two theories. Jahn shows that even during the 
Cold War, usually seen as a time when realism dominated in both the theoretical and the practical realm, liberalism 
mattered greatly. 
And yet, due to the rich, diverse, complex and even contradictory range of policies associated with liberalism, 
which present seemingly insurmountable challenges for theorization, there is no coherent overall account of 
liberalism. Jahn argues that different liberal thinkers make use of different aspects of liberalism according to 
their needs (e.g., either historic or contemporary liberalism), resulting in profound contradictions. For example, 
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liberalism tends to be peaceful, but its extension of economic interests worldwide may entail the use of force. This 
raises the question, she argues, what exactly is ‘liberal’ about all of these policies, and often the “anti-realism label” 
stuck to facilitate things. While the author is right to point out that liberalism is marked by some contradictions, 
it must also be kept in mind that realism, too, contains many seemingly contradictory claims and subtypes that 
do not fully align. 
Jahn’s account of Locke, whom she calls the father of liberalism, is instructive, showing that he saw himself 
confronted with the task of promoting liberalism in a nonliberal environment – a theme that marks liberalism until 
today. Yet the author describes the empirical support for Locke’s claims as “thin” and the supportive evidence he 
presents “highly questionable” – causing a split between competing conceptions of liberalism on either its principles 
or its practices. Jahn’s analysis focus on Locke’s contradictions (for example, while English law of the land protects 
its commons against outsiders, Amerindian laws do not). 
Locke is lambasted in a seemingly endless fashion. According to Jahn,
the practical importance of Locke’s philosophy of history is not exhausted by these early cases of colonial 
appropriation. Rather, as an integral part of liberal theory, the philosophy of history has ever since been 
a dynamic tool protecting liberal theoretical evidence from empirical counterevidence. Favorable historical 
conjunctures (such as the end of the Cold War) – in which liberal forces appear to dominate – are interpreted 
as supportive evidence for liberal claims, while adverse historical conjunctures, instead of undermining liberal 
claims and principles, are simply interpreted as the result of lower levels of historical development. 
Jahn is certainly right to paint early liberal thinkers as flawed and hypocritical (Uday Singh Mehta comes to a 
very similar conclusion in “Liberalism and Empire”, reviewed here). And yet, while Mill and others were certainly 
wrong to condone and even support colonialism and slavery, their assessments must be seen in the context of their 
time, when such practices were commonly accepted, and it is questionable in how far Mill’s nobler achievements 
can be discarded altogether because of his support of the British Empire’s occupation of India. Early liberal thinkers 
struggled with applying their seemingly universal principles universally, yet rejecting their ideas as a consequence 
seems misguided. 
Furthermore, Jahn challenges the notion that liberalism contains within itself the seeds of its own democratization, 
pointing out that universal political franchise was only introduced to avoid revolutions: “Democracy is usually not 
given by the elite because its values have changed.” While this argument has some merit, it must equally be pointed 
out that it social movements at the time essentially adopted liberal ideas to make their case for reform – liberalism 
was thus far more important in the process of democratization in Europe that the book suggests. 
Jahn concludes that, while liberalism keeps adapting to circumstances, its underlying dynamic is the same: 
Liberalism, she argues, is a political project that aims to establish individual freedom through private property 
and to protect and extend this freedom through government by consent – yet, it pursues this goal through the 
privatization/ expropriation of common property and hence requires the production and reproduction of unequal 
power relations domestically and internationally. Liberalism is thus, in essence, made viable through power politics, 
with the mere difference that is uses liberal rhetoric as a fig leaf to conceal the ultimate goal: To provide a justification 
for American hegemony. 
In criticizing liberalism (and some realists) for espousing modernization theory, the author appears to be 
denying that economic development has generated conditions propitious for democratic stability, and that both 
are linked to interstate peace. Of course there are contradictions in liberal world order, evident throughout history, 
and so are some incoherences of liberalism itself. For example, democracy promotion is applied systematically 
wherever it aligns with economic interests (such as in Eastern Europe), half-heartedly in places where autocracy 
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assures stability (such as in Saudi Arabia and China) and not at all in places where democracy can endanger 
strategic interests (such as in Gaza). And yet, Jahn does not recognize that, despite its problematic elements, today’s 
order has clearly contributed to the current era of unprecedentedly low and declining interstate conflict. Today’s 
order is far from problem-free, and policy makers in the Global South who argue that the major threat to global 
stability emanates from the United States are not just engaged in empty rhetoric – yet Jahn’s criticism is at times 
too sweeping to contribute to a constructive debate, and her book lacks concrete alternatives about how to organize 
the world differently. 
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